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Abstract
This paper examines the role of intellectual property in developing coun-
tries in oshore outsourcing of R&D. We nd that strengthened intellectual
property protection in developing countries provides incentive for rms, both
multinational and local, to specialize in undertaking an R&D activity in which
it has competitive advantage (the specialization eect). It also facilitates the
process for local rms to switch from imitators to potential innovators (the
switching eect). We demonstrate that the multinational rm's strategic be-
havior on IPR enforcement can be used as an eective instrument to subsidize
contractual research and development in developing countries (the subsidizing
eect). We further illustrate how a policy mix of IPR and FDI subsidy in
developing countries aects R&D activities adding an oshore R&D subsidiary
as an additional organizational form.
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11 Introduction
We are living in an age of outsourcing (Grossman and Helpman 2005). The
ongoing process of outsourcing has even gone global by taking the form of oshore
outsourcing | the relocation of business functions to an oshore provider external to
the rm. Recently, oshore outsourcing is no longer limited to what rms perceive as
non-core functions such as customer call centers or billing/collections; rms are now
outsourcing key tasks such as research and development (R&D) to oshore providers
through contractual R&D.
There is considerable evidence of this new trend in a variety of industries. In the
pharmaceutical industry, the largest multinational pharmaceutical rms, including
Merck, Eli Lilly, and Johnson & Johnson, rst moved manufacturing and clinical-
trial work to China and India. And now, driven by cost pressures and growth op-
portunities, they are partnering with rms there to do sophisticated drug research
and clinical testing (Wadhwa 2008a). Indian companies such as Ranbaxy, Advinus
Therapeutics, Nicholas Piramal and Jubilant have negotiated long-term deals with
western pharmaceutical companies to discover and develop new chemical entities. A
Chinese company, Hutchison MediPharma, has formed a similar partnership with Eli
Lilly (Wadhwa 2008b). There is also a fast expansion of oshore outsourcing of R&D
in the information technology (IT) industry. A lot of multinational IT rms, like
Dell, Motorola and Philips are buying not only cell phones but also complete designs
of some digital services from Asian developers. The R&D outsourcing market for
information technology in India is projected to grow to more than $9 billion by 2010
from $1.3 billion in 2003, according to a study conducted by a business consulting
rm Frost & Sullivan (Frost & Sullivan 2004). In the aerospace industry, Boeing Co.
is working with India's HCL technologies to co-develop software for everything from
2navigation systems and landing gear to its upcoming 7E7 Dreamliner jet (Engardio
and Einhorn 2005).
At the macro level, data on licensing payments also show the boost of contrac-
tual R&D between multinational rms and local rms in developing countries. For
example, U.S. licensing payments to Chinese rms rose from $1 million in 1995 to
$13 million in 2000, reaching $115 million in 2007. U.S. licensing payments to Indian
rms rose from $2 million in 2000 to $98 million in 2007.1 China's ocial balance
of payment statistics show that the licensing fee payments received by Chinese rms
have registered a substantial increase, from US$82 million in 2000 to US$343 million
in 2007. This highlights the fact that developing countries such as China and India
have been increasingly engaged in the vertical specialization of global R&D activities.
There are several reasons for the proliferation of international specialization in
R&D activities. 2 First, several developing countries, for example, India, China, and
Brazil, have succeeded in building up research and development capacity in recent
years, thereby reducing the technology gap between developed countries and devel-
oping countries. Second, research and development in some industries, for example,
the pharmaceutical industry, is highly complex and prohibitively expensive. With
intensifying globalization, multinational rms are under pressure to reduce the costs
involved in R&D. Factors like lower labor cost, time saving due to the time zone
dierence between some developed countries and developing countries, higher patient
enrolment rates as well as the prevalence of a wide variety of diseases and a heteroge-
1The data is from the U.S. Department of Commerce, available at
http://www.bea.gov/international/intlserv.htm
2Ernst (2005) attributes internationalization of innovation to the following: (1) institutional
change through liberalization; (2) the impact of information and communication technology; (3)
market competition and organizational change; adjustments in corporate strategy and business
models.
3neous gene pool all contribute to the cost advantage in the drug research process.3 As
a result, the strategy of multinational rms is to specialize in a particular component
of the R&D chain by which cost reduction in R&D could be achieved.
The oshore outsourcing of R&D presents fresh opportunities for developing
countries in promoting their R&D activities, yet it creates new challenges to their
intellectual property right (IPR) policy. While multinational rms (MNEs) nd it
protable in the short term by engaging in oshore outsourcing of R&D, there are
growing concerns about the loss of core proprietary business knowledge and intellec-
tual property. In particular, oshore outsourcing is vulnerable to high turnover rates
which create potential problems relating to sharing company trade secrets with a new
employer and competitor (Hemphill 2005). Moreover, potential subcontractors in de-
veloping countries might nd it more protable by undertaking imitation instead of
subcontracting. Under these circumstances, what is the role of intellectual property
in aecting MNEs' incentive to outsource R&D as well as local rms' incentive to
switch from an imitator to a R&D subcontractor? How should developing countries
reform their IPR policy to be more conducive to their R&D activities in the age of
globalization of R&D?
Previous research has addressed the question of whether developing countries can
benet from protecting intellectual property. It has been argued that strengthening
intellectual property was not in the interest of developing countries as stronger in-
tellectual property leads to an increase in the imitation cost of the Southern rms
3For example, bringing a new molecule to the market in the pharmaceutical industry was esti-
mated at about $800 million in 2005, out of which a signicant portion was spent on testing the
drug on patients prior to commercial approval. A recent McKinsey study has suggested that cost
saving in the drug research process is about $200 million if clinical trials are carried out in India.
See \The HINDU survey of Indian Industry 2004" available at http://www.thehindu.com.
4(Chin and Grossman 1990), reduction of consumer surplus due to monopoly pricing
(Deardor 1992), diminishing in both the long-run Northern rate of innovation and
Southern welfare (Helpman 1993) .
Recently, economists began to realize that developing countries could benet from
stronger IPR in several aspects. Maskus and Penubarti(1995), Maskus (2000), Yang
and Maskus (2001) and Chen and Puttitanun (2005) are the recent studies focusing on
how stronger IPR could encourage inward 
ows of technology, a faster ability to close
this gap in technological sophistication between themselves and rich countries and a

owering of local innovation. For instance, Yang and Maskus (2001) demonstrate that
stronger IPR could increase long-run technology transfer and innovation if the mode
of transfer is licensing as stronger IPR reduces the costs of such transfers relative to
imitation costs and increases the licensor's share of production rents.
Another strand of the literature analyzes the impacts of intellectual property
protection on R&D incentives and technology transfer in the presence of \tourna-
ment eect". Chowdhury (2005) argues that if patent protection makes the R&D
competition into tournament, it reduces R&D investment if the tournament eect
is negative. Mukherjee (2006) shows that the eect of either imitation or technol-
ogy licensing may always dominate the tournament eect and create higher R&D
investment under patent protection.4
The above literature, however, has not touched on the impacts of stronger in-
tellectual property in developing countries on the contractual R&D activities which
have proliferated in recent years. Our paper lls this void by oering a new perspec-
tive on the protection of IPRs in developing countries and establishing a link between
4In a related paper, Mukherjee and Pennings (2004) discuss the relationship between the choice
of technology adoption and patent protection when an incumbent faces the threat of imitation from
an entrant.
5intellectual property and oshore outsourcing of R&D.
We consider a model where two rms in a developing country, one multinational
and one local, produce a product composed of two components. The multinational
rm and the local rm have competitive advantage in conducting R&D on component
1 and component 2 respectively. The multinational rm always undertakes R&D
on component 1 due to its competitive advantage. The local rm, however, can
either undertake R&D on component 2 and license it to the multinational rm as a
subcontractor or imitate the multinational rm's technology on component 1 as an
imitator, depending on the intellectual property protection in developing countries.
In a three-stage game where the choice of the local rm as a subcontractor or imitator
is determined in the rst stage and two rms engage in process R&D or imitation
in the second stage and then Cournot competition in the third stage, we nd the
following results.
First, we demonstrate that strong IPR in developing countries may induce rms,
both multinational and local, to specialize in one stage of R&D, a \specialization
eect" attributed to strong IPR. Second, we consider the possibility that an original
imitator in developing countries may not be an imitator forever. Instead, it could
eventually become a potential innovator. We show that there is a \switching eect"
due to strong IPR. Third, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, our paper sug-
gests that multinational rm's strategic behavior on IPR enforcement can be used as
an eective instrument to subsidize contractual research and development in devel-
oping countries, which is benecial to both local rms and multinational rms (the
subsidizing eect). Fourth, we nd that the welfare of developing countries could
rise with strengthened IPR under large cost saving from contractual R&D and the
relatively strong bargaining position of the Southern rm. Fifth, we illustrate how
a policy mix of IPR and FDI subsidy in developing countries aects R&D activi-
6ties adding an oshore R&D subsidiary as an additional organizational form. Our
analysis suggests that stronger patent protection is likely to expand the international
contractual R&D activities. Alternatively, developing countries with weak patent
protection could oer incentives to multinational rms in establishing oshore R&D
subsidiaries by reducing their R&D subsidiary setup costs.
Our paper is most closely related to Chen and Puttitanun (2005).5 They consider
a model of a developing country that has two sectors, an import sector and a local
sector. While stronger IPR encourage domestic innovation in the local sector, it
also makes it more dicult for a domestic imitator to imitate the more advanced
foreign rm's technology in the import sector. Hence the choice of IPR in developing
countries needs to balance these two eects. In contrast, we focus on the role of IPR
in the context where both a MNE and a local rm have competitive advantage in
one stage of the R&D chain of a complex technology in the same sector. We also
consider the possibility that an original imitator in developing countries may not be
an imitator forever. Instead, it could eventually become a potential innovator.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present a basic
model of R&D oshore outsourcing. We analyze the equilibrium outcomes under no
patent protection in section 3 and under strengthened patent protection in section
4, respectively. We then demonstrate how the equilibrium outcomes will be changed
by allowing for the multinationals rms' strategic behavior on IPR enforcement in
section 5. The impacts of strengthened IPR on the welfare of the developing country
5Our paper is also related to the literature on outsourcing. See Grossman and Helpman (2005),
Jones (2005), Chen, et al., (2004), Riezman and Wang (2008), Mukherjee and Dinda (forthcoming),
among others. However, the above literature does not look into the international R&D outsourcing
and the impacts of intellectual property in developing countries from a North-South perspective,
which is the focus of our paper.
7are studied in section 6. We further examine how the Southern government can
choose a policy mix of IPR and FDI subsidy by adding an R&D subsidiary as an
alternative organizational form in section 7. We oer concluding remarks and some
possible extensions in the nal section.
2 The basic setup
In this section we lay out a model which captures the recent trend of interna-
tionalization of R&D activities, as discussed in the introduction section. Consider a
market with two rms, one N rm (the multinational) and one S rm (the local),6
producing a homogeneous product using two components and competing in Cournot
fashion. If a represents the market size of the world, the inverse-demand function for
our product is given by P = a   q, where P is the price of the product and q the
quantity produced.7 Let ci(i = 1;2) denote rms' marginal production costs related
to the rst and second component, respectively, before process innovation or imita-
tion.8 Firms' marginal production costs related to component i can be reduced to ~ ci
by process innovation and to ~ ci by imitation. Here  is a parameter representing
rms' imitation capacity given by such characteristics of the South as education level
and infrastructure, where a lower value of  indicates higher imitation capacity. Since
the imitator has no access to tacit knowledge including know-how and information
6Our ndings remain qualitatively intact with dierent numbers of Southern rms engaging in
quantity competition.
7We assume that market size a is suciently greater than marginal costs to ensure positive
production of both rms.
8The R&D we consider in this paper is cost-reduction R&D, or process innovation, as most
contractual R&D activities in developing countries are targeted at cost reduction instead of quality
improvement.
8gained from experience, we have  > 1. Hence we have ~ ci < ~ ci < ci. Thus, both
imitation and innovation reduce rms' marginal cost but the decline is greater in the
latter case.
Assume that the N rm has competitive advantage in conducting R&D on compo-
nent 1 because it has higher technological level; the S rm has competitive advantage
in conducting R&D on component 2 because it has the advantage of lower labor
cost and some other advantages discussed in the introduction section. To focus on
the analysis of rms' incentive to undertake contractual R&D, we assume that only
the N rm conducts process innovation on component 1 before the game starts. We
also assume that the N rm produces in the North and the S rm produces in the
South.9 Let RN and RS denote R&D costs on component 2 of the N rm and the
S rm. Here we assume RS < RN, re
ecting the competitive advantage of the S
rm in conducting R&D on component 2. Therefore the N rm can either under-
take in-house R&D on component 2 or outsource the R&D on component 2 to the
S rm.10 If oshore outsourcing of R&D occurs, we assume that the N rm oers
9In this paper we have chosen to focus on the eects of change in IPR regime on contractual
R&D activities between the North and the South. Therefore, issues including trade in nal goods
and intermediate goods as well as the oshore outsourcing of production are beyond the scope of
this paper.
10In principle, the N rm could also license the technology on component 1 to the S rm to take
advantage of the low cost in the South. However, licensing of the technology on component 1 from
the N rm to the S rm is often not feasible in the real world for two reasons. First, the N rm
tends to protect its core technologies from leakage. Second, transferring the core technology would
incur high technology transfer cost due to the low learning capacity in the South. For example, in
the pharmaceutical industry it is not easy for the N rm to license the core technology because these
big N pharmaceutical rms have to conduct a lot of worldwide tests to satisfy the FDA (Federal
Drug Authority) in the USA, which are not feasible for the S rms as the amount of resources are
beyond their reach.
9a take-it-or-leave-it contract with a lump-sum license fee to the S rm which the S
rm accepts if it is not worse-o compared to that without licensing. Consequently,
the S rm gets its reservation value and all the surplus accrues to the N rm. We
denote the lump-sum license fee by L, which must be paid to acquire the technology
on component 2 innovated by the S rm.
The time sequence of the game is as follows. In the rst stage, the N rm oers
the R&D contract which the S rm may accept or reject. If the contract is accepted,
the S rm undertakes R&D in component 2 and licenses it to the N rm in stage 2
and both rms compete in quantities in a Cournot setting in stage 3. If the contract
is rejected, in the second stage the N rm undertakes in-house R&D on component
2 and the S rm chooses among three strategies: (i) imitating the technology on
component 1 without undertaking R&D on component 2; (ii) conducting R&D in
component 2 without imitating the technology on component 1; (iii) imitating the
technology on component 1 along with undertaking R&D on component 2.11 Both
rms compete in quantities in a Cournot setting and prots are realized in stage 3.12
In this context we assume that f ( ; ) represents the production relationship be-
tween marginal production costs of components and the rms' marginal production
cost of the product, where the rst (second) argument is the marginal cost of the
11By assuming that RS < S(~ c1+~ c2;c1+~ c2) S(~ c1+~ c2;c1+c2), strategy (ii) always dominates
the strategy of no imitation or no innovation, a potential fourth strategy. This assumption is made
to minimize technical details that are not essential for our results. Our ndings remain intact if we
relax this assumption.
12We rule out the possibility that the N rm can imitate the S rm's technology on component
2 to avoid the complication of the model. One practical justication for this assumption is the S
rm not only applies for a patent for its technology in developing counties, but also in developed
countries. Hence, it makes it harder for the N rm to imitate the S rm's technology as the patent
protection is much stronger in developed countries.
10component 1(component 2).13 Suppose the N rm's marginal production cost of the
product are cN and ~ cN in the absence and presence of process R&D on component
2, respectively. Thus, we have cN = f(~ c1;c2) and ~ cN = f(~ c1;~ c2). Let the S rm's
marginal production cost be c
S, ~ cS and ~ c
S under strategy (i), (ii) and (iii), respec-
tively. Hence, we have ~ cS = f(c1;~ c2), c
S = f(~ c1;c2) and ~ c
S = f(~ c1;~ c2). We also
denote the prot function of rm j by j ( ; )(j = N;S), where the rst (second)
argument is the marginal cost of the N rm (the S rm).
We now proceed to discuss the behavior and payo of rms in two cases: one
with no patent protection and the other with strengthened patent protection.
3 Under no patent protection
First consider the scenario where there is no patent protection in the developing
country. Strength of patent protection of a country refers to the adequacy the laws
and regulations it has in place as well as enforcement mechanism in order to provide
transparency and certainty for investors, licensees, and customers (Maskus 2004). In
our context no patent protection means that rms do not need to pay an imitation
cost if there is an infringement of existing patents.
We begin by analyzing the case with a successful licensing. In this event the S
rm undertakes R&D on component 2 and licenses it to the N rm in stage 2. We
initially focus on the case where there is no imitation under licensing. Hence, the
payos of the N and the S rm under licensing are given by N(~ cN;~ cS)   L and
S(~ cN;~ cS) + L   RS, respectively. If the N rm's licensing contract is rejected, the
N rm undertakes in-house R&D on component 2 and the S rm chooses among
13The precise form of f ( ; ) is not crucial for our results.
11three options mentioned in section 2. Under no patent protection strategy (ii) is
always dominated by strategy (iii) because the S rm does not need to pay the
imitation cost in case of patent infringement. Thus, we focus on the comparison of
payos under strategy (i) and (iii). If the S rm chooses to imitate the technology on
component 1 without undertaking R&D in component 2 (strategy (i)), the payos of
the N rm and the S rm are given by N(~ cN;c
S) RN and S(~ cN;c
S), respectively.
If the S rm chooses to conduct R&D on component 2 along with imitating the
technology on component 1 (strategy (iii)), the payos of the N rm and the S rm
are N(~ cN;~ c
S) RN and S(~ cN;~ c
S) RS, respectively. Licensing could only occur if
the joint prot under licensing is greater than that of strategy (i) and that of strategy
(iii).
By comparing the above payo functions, we nd that the S rm's prot under
strategy (iii) is greater than that under strategy (i) if the S rm's R&D cost on
component 2 is less than a threshold value K1 = S(~ cN;~ c
S)   S(~ cN;c
S), where
K1 denotes the dierence of the S rm's production prot under strategy (iii) and
strategy (i). Next, we nd that the joint prot of both rms under licensing is greater
than that under strategy (i) if the S rm's R&D cost on component 2 is less than a
threshold value K2 = RN+N(~ cN;~ cS)+S(~ cN;~ cS) N(~ cN;c
S) S(~ cN;c
S), where K2
denotes the dierence between the joint production prot under licensing and total
joint payos re
ecting both production prots and R&D cost under strategy (i).14 We
then summarize our results as follows: (1) the S rm would accept the contract and
undertake contractual R&D with its payo under strategy (iii) as reservation value if
RS < K1; (2) the S rm would accept the contract and undertake contractual R&D
with its payo under strategy (i) as reservation value if K1 < RS < K2; (3) the S
rm would deny the contract and imitate the technology on component 1 without
14For simplicity we assume that K1 < K2.
12undertaking R&D on component 2 if RS > K2 (See Appendix A for proof).
In summary, contractual R&D only occurs when RS < K2, where the value of
K2 depends on three factors: the N rm's R&D cost on component 2, the joint prot
under contractual R&D and the joint prot under imitation which is aected by the
S rm's imitation capacity. This result demonstrates that in an environment where
there is no patent protection in the South contractual R&D between the N rm and
the S rm becomes more likely under low S rm's R&D cost and high N rm's R&D
cost on component 2. Further, the lower the S rm's imitation capacity, the more
likely is contractual R&D.
4 Under strengthened patent protection
Now consider the case with strengthened patent protection, where the Southern
country provides adequate laws and regulations as well as enforcement. It implies
that rms have to pay an imitation cost if there is an infringement of existing patents.
We rst analyze the scenario where the N rm always has the incentive for strong
IPR enforcement, in the sense that the N rm always brings a law suit against the
S rm if the S rm imitates the N rm's process innovation on component 1. In
this event rms have to pay an imitation cost if there is an infringement of existing
patents. Let I denote the S rm's imitation cost in the form of nes from law suits.
In this event the payos of the N and the S rm with a successful licensing are
given by N(~ cN;~ cS)   L and S(~ cN;~ cS) + L   RS, respectively.15 In the absence of
15Our results would be essentially the same if we consider the possibility that the S rm commits
not to produce after a successful licensing under strengthened IPR. Under such circumstances the
N rm is a monopoly in the market and the S rm does not produce in the third stage.
13licensing, the payos of the N rm and the S rm are given by N(~ cN;c
S)   RN + I
and S(~ cN;c
S)   I under strategy (i); N(~ cN;~ cS)   RN and S(~ cN;~ cS)   RS under
strategy (ii); N(~ cN;~ c
S)   RN + I and S(~ cN;~ c
S)   RS   I under strategy (iii).
By comparing the above payo functions, we nd that the joint prot of both
rms under licensing is greater than that under strategy (i) if the S rm's R&D cost
on component 2 is less than a threshold value K0




2 denotes the dierence between the joint produc-
tion prot under licensing and total joint payo under strategy (i). Thus, we nd that
a successful licensing only occurs for RS < K0
2 and no licensing occurs otherwise. By
comparing the equilibrium under no patent protection and that under strengthened
patent protection, it can be shown that it is more likely for the S rm to undertake
contractual R&D in component 2 under strengthened patent protection than under
no patent protection as K0
2 is greater than K2 (see Appendix B for proof).16 Hence,
we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Patent protection increases rms' incentive for specialization in
undertaking R&D when each rm has competitive advantage in research and devel-
opment in one component respectively.
The economic intuition is as follows. Under no patent protection, it could be
more protable for rms to imitate their competitor's technology as they do not need
16If we consider the possibility that the S rm commits not to produce after a successful licensing
under strengthened IPR, contractual R&D occurs if the S rm's R&D cost on component 2 is less
than a threshold value K00
2 = RN +M(~ cN) N(~ cN;c
S) S(~ cN;c
S)+I, where M(~ cN) denotes the
N rm's monopoly production prot under a successful licensing. It is easy to show K00
2 > K0 > K.
This implies that allowing for the S rm commits not to produce after a successful licensing actually
expands the range of parameter values under which adoption of strong IPR promotes contractual
R&D in the developing country. Hence our results will be strengthened under such circumstances.
14to pay an imitation cost in the form of nes from the law suits. Strengthened patent
protection thus reduces rms' incentive to imitate as they face the imitation cost
and enhances the S rm's incentive to shift from imitation to conducting cooperative
R&D. The above analysis suggests that in an environment where both the multina-
tional and the local rms have their own competitive advantage in one stage of the
R&D chain, strengthened patent protection encourages the specialization of R&D
and therefore contractual R&D activities between the North and the South.
5 Strategic IPR enforcement
In previous sections we have demonstrated that patent protection encourages
international specialization in R&D, in particular in contractual R&D activities be-
tween multinationals and local rms. We next turn to an analysis on how rms'
incentive on IPR enforcement and the equilibrium results can be changed by multi-
nationals rms' strategic behavior on IPR enforcement.
In section 4 we analyzed the scenario where the N rm always chooses to bring
a law suit against the S rm in case of patent infringement. In this section we
discuss the possibility that the N rm may choose strategic weak IPR enforcement
even though the Southern government provides adequate laws and regulations, in the
sense that the N rm may choose not to bring a law suit against the S rm when
the S rm imitates the N rm's technology on component 1. To include the N rm's
strategic incentive on IPR enforcement, the time sequence of the game is modied
as follows. In the rst stage, given the Southern patent scope, the N rm chooses
between strong enforcement and strategic weak enforcement under contractual R&D.
If the N rm chooses strong enforcement, the S rm does not imitate the N rm's
15technology on component 1 under contractual R&D, knowing the N rm will bring
a lawsuit against it with patent infringement. If the N rm chooses strategic weak
enforcement, the S rm is permitted to imitate the N rm's technology on component
1 under contractual R&D. If the contract is accepted, the S rm undertakes R&D
on component 2 and licenses it to the N rm in stage 2. The S rm imitates the N
rm's technology on component 1 if the N rm chooses strategic weak enforcement
and does not imitate otherwise. If the contract is rejected, the N rm undertakes
in-house R&D on component 2 and the S rm chooses among the three strategies
discussed in section 2 in stage 2. Under this circumstance the N rm always chooses
strong IPR enforcement with patent infringement. Both rms compete in quantities
in a Cournot setting in stage 3.
As shown in Appendix B, with strong enforcement the contractual R&D occurs
if RS < K0
2 and does not occur otherwise. As the N rm has the new option of
strategic weak IPR enforcement, the S rm's outside options do not change. Hence,
the payos of both rms in the absence of a successful R&D contract are the same as
those in section 4. In the presence of a successful R&D contract, the payos of the
N and the S rm are given by N(~ cN;~ cS)   L and S(~ cN;~ cS) + L   RS with strong
enforcement. They become N(~ cN;~ c
S) L and S(~ cN;~ c
S)+L RS with strategic weak
enforcement. Accordingly, the joint prot of the N and S rm under contractual R&D
is N(~ cN;~ cS)+S(~ cN;~ cS) RS with strong enforcement and N(~ cN;~ c
S)+S(~ cN;~ c
S) 
RS with weak enforcement. As the outside options of contractual R&D with strong
enforcement are the same as those with weak enforcement, the licensing equilibrium
becomes more likely the greater the joint prot under licensing. Thus, we focus on
the comparison of joint prot under contractual R&D with strong enforcement and
that with strategic weak enforcement.
In a Cournot duopoly model the industry prot increases as one of the rms
16are more ecient given that these two rms are reasonably close in terms of their
initial technologies (Marjit 1990).17 More specically, in our setting it can be inferred
that the industry prot under strategic weak IPR enforcement is greater than that
under strong enforcement if c
S <
a+4~ cN
5 .18 This result suggests that strategic IPR
weak enforcement increases the joint industry prot if the technology gap of the N
rm and the S rm undertaking the potential contractual R&D is reasonably small.
Further, the N rm is better o under strategic weak IPR enforcement than that
under strong enforcement as the S rm only gets its reservation value and all surplus
accrues to the N rm.





is the dierence between the joint production prot under contractual R&D with
strategic weak IPR enforcement and total joint payo under strategy (i). Note that
the joint production prot under contractual R&D with strategic weak IPR enforce-
ment is greater than that with strong IPR enforcement, thus it can be shown that
K is greater than K0
2. Similar to the analysis in section 4, we now have the follow-
ing equilibrium results: (1) Contractual R&D occurs for RS < K where the S rm
undertakes R&D on component 2 along with imitating the N rm's technology on
component 1 without a lawsuit from the N rm; (2) Contractual R&D does not occur
otherwise. Comparing the equilibrium results with the option of strategic weak en-
forcement and those with strong enforcement discussed in section 4, it can be shown
that for K0
2 < RS < K contractual R&D would occur if the N rm has the option of
17Let c1 and c2 denote rm 1 and rm 2's marginal production cost and assume c1 < c2. As is
shown in Marjit (1990), the Cournot industry prot decreases with c2 if c2 < a+4c1
5 . The economic
intuition is that the loss in prot of rm 1 can only be compensated by an increase in prot of rm
2 when the initial market share of rm 2 is suciently large (technology gap between rm 1 and
rm 2 is close enough).
18The condition that c
S < a+4~ cN
5 also guarantees ~ cS < a+4~ cN
5 .
17strategic weak IPR enforcement, but would not occur with strong IPR enforcement
(See Appendix C for proof). Hence, it is more likely for the S rm to undertake
contractual R&D on component 2 by allowing for the option of strategic weak IPR
enforcement. Hence, the following proposition is immediate.
Proposition 2: The N rm's strategic behavior on weak enforcement of IPR
may increase the possibility of contractual R&D in developing countries.
The intuition is as follows. If the S rm imitates the technology on component 1
and the N rm chooses not to bring in a lawsuit against the S rm, the S rm produces
more eciently while the N rm's marginal production cost does not change, which
in turn increases the total industry prot and makes the licensing more likely. The
N rm's payo increases since it extracts all the increase in the industry prot as
it makes a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the S rm. Under such circumstances the
option of strategic weak IPR enforcement encourages contractual R&D activities.
We illustrate the above equilibrium results under dierent circumstances in Figure
1, where the horizontal axis represents the S rm's R&D cost on component 2 and




as the joint prot under contractual R&D with no patent protection, strong patent




I are dened as the joint prot under
imitation without innovation with no patent protection, strong patent protection with
strong enforcement and strong patent protection with strategic weak enforcement,
respectively. The joint prots under contractual R&D correspond to the downward
sloping lines as they decrease with the S rm's R&D cost on component 2. The joint
prots under imitation without innovation correspond to the horizontal lines as they
are independent of the S rm's R&D cost on component 2.
18As shown in Figure 1, in the rst case where there is no patent protection, the
joint prot under contractual R&D (NP
C ) exceeds that under imitation without
innovation (NP
I ) if RS < K2 and vice versa, thus the curve of NP
C is above the
curve of NP
I for RS < K2 and below the curve of NP
I for RS > K2. Hence,
under no patent protection contractual R&D is the equilibrium if RS is less than the
threshold value K2 and imitation without innovation is the equilibrium otherwise.
With strengthened patent protection along with strong enforcement, the joint prot
under contractual R&D (SP
C ) does not change (SP
C = NP
C ) while the joint prot
under imitation without innovation (SP
I ) is lower due to the presence of the imitation
cost (SP
I < NP
I ). Therefore, the two curves, NP
C and SP
C , coincide with each other
while the curve of SP
I is below the curve of NP
I , accordingly the threshold value
becomes K0
2. Thus, in the case of strengthened patent protection, contractual R&D
is the equilibrium if RS is less than the threshold value K0
2 and imitation without
innovation is the equilibrium otherwise. Finally, in the event of strategic weak IPR
enforcement, the joint prot under contractual R&D (WE
C ) expands due to the
increase in the S rm's eciency (WE
C > SP
C ) while the joint prot under imitation
without innovation (WE
I ) remains unchanged (WE
I = SP
I ). It follows that the
curves of WE
I and SP
I coincide with each other while the curve of WE
C is above
the curve of SP
C , hence the threshold value changes to K.19 That is, in the case of
strategic weak IPR enforcement, contractual R&D is the equilibrium if RS is less than
the threshold value K and imitation without innovation is the equilibrium otherwise.
In Appendix A and B, we show that K2 < K0
2 < K.
19Note that K1 is not shown in the gure because it involves the comparison of the S rm's prot
under strategy (i) and (iii), but not the comparison of the joint prot.
196 Welfare impacts of IPR policy
We have discussed the role of IPR in encouraging contractual R&D activity be-
tween the N rm and the S rm. It is of interest to evaluate the impacts of changes
in the patent regime on the welfare of the Southern country, dened as the sum of
local consumer surplus and the S rm's production prot. The detailed calculations
in this context are complex and, to save space, we simply overview the results here
(See Appendix D for mathematical computations).
6.1 Welfare impacts of strengthened IPR
We rst discuss the change in Southern welfare from no patent protection to
strengthened patent protection. Here we focus on the analysis of the case where in
equilibrium the S rm is an imitator without innovation under no patent protection
and becomes an innovator undertaking contractual R&D under strengthened patent
protection. The policy shift from no patent protection to strengthened IPR in de-
veloping countries has two distinct eects on the domestic welfare. First, this policy
shift encourages contractual R&D, which increases the productivity of the S rm and
expands consumption in the Southern market. Second, the increase in imitation cost
decreases the S rm's prot under imitation, thereby decreasing its reservation value
under licensing. Accordingly, strengthened IPR decreases the S rm's prot under
licensing. However, the consumer gain due to the increase in the S rm's produc-
tivity becomes larger with the increase in the cost saving shifting from imitation to
innovation. Further, as the S rm's bargaining strength increases, the S rm's prot
as well as the Southern welfare will be enhanced with the strengthened IPR.20 In
20The S rm's bargaining strength will be increased as the S rm may license its technology on one
component to multiple N rms who produce dierentiated goods but all use the S rm's technology
20brief, strengthened patent protection will raise local welfare with large cost saving
from innovation and the relatively strong bargaining position of the Southern rm.
6.2 Welfare impacts of strategic IPR Enforcement
For the change in Southern welfare when shifting from strong enforcement to
strategic weak enforcement, we mainly discuss the case where the equilibrium regime
is imitation without innovation under strong enforcement and it becomes contractual
R&D under strategic weak enforcement. Upon reaching the licensing equilibrium
range, the S rm's productivity is increased which expands consumer gains in the
Southern market. The S rm's prot does not change under strategic weak IPR
enforcement as it gets the same reservation value as that under strong IPR enforce-
ment. Accordingly, the Southern welfare rises with the N rm's strategic weak IPR
enforcement. However, given the choice of imitating the N rm's process innovation
on component 1, the S rm may have less incentive to undertake R&D on component
1, thereby reducing the S rm's bargaining strength and diminishing the Southern
welfare if we extend the evaluation to a longer time horizon.
7 Adding oshore R&D subsidiary
We have analyzed the multinational rm's choice between undertaking in-house
R&D and outsourcing the contractual R&D to a local rm. An alternative organiza-
tional choice for a multinational rm is to establish a wholly-owned R&D subsidiary
in developing countries. Increasingly, multinational rms have established not only
sales and manufacturing operations but also research and development facilities in
as one stage in the R&D chain. We will discuss this situation in section 8.
21developing countries. By setting up R&D subsidiaries in developing countries, multi-
national rms are able to take advantage of lower R&D cost in developing countries.
To capture this feature, we now incorporate a simple specication of an R&D sub-
sidiary into the model.
Suppose the N rm has the option of establishing an R&D subsidiary in the South.
Following Antr as and Helpman (2004), we assume that the xed organizational cost
under integration abroad (set up an R&D subsidiary) is greater than that under
outsourcing (conducting contractual R&D activities with local rms). To simplify
the analysis, we assume that a setup cost f is incurred under integration (set up an
R&D subsidiary) while no setup cost is incurred under outsourcing. We also assume
that the R&D cost on component 2 of the S subsidiary is RS, the same as that of the
S rm undertaking contractual R&D, re
ecting the fact that the S subsidiary is also
able to take advantage of lower R&D cost in developing countries. As a result, the
cost dierence between conducting R&D through an R&D subsidiary and through
outsourcing is the setup cost f.21
In this setup, the N rm has two outside options: conducting in-house R&D
in the North and setting up an R&D subsidiary in the South, while the S rm
has three outside options set out in previous sections in case of a breakup of the
negotiation of contractual R&D. Working through the payo functions we have the
following results.22 If the subsidiary setup costs are large and patent protection is
weak, in equilibrium the N rm conducts in-house R&D. In this event the N rm
does not choose an R&D subsidiary due to the large setup cost, while the S rm
has no incentive to undertake contractual R&D due to the high reservation value
under imitation. As the Southern countries strengthens its patent protection, the
21In this section we focus on the case without strategic weak IPR enforcement.
22See Appendix E for proof.
22equilibrium shifts from integration at home (conducting in-house R&D in the North)
to outsourcing (undertaking contractual R&D), where the Southern rm shifts from
an imitator to an innovator undertaking contractual R&D. If subsidiary setup costs
are suciently small while patent protection is weak, in equilibrium the N rm chooses
to conduct R&D via an R&D subsidiary. Strengthened patent protection shifts the
equilibrium from integration abroad (setting up an R&D subsidiary) to outsourcing
(undertaking contractual R&D) in this event.
The above results can be characterized as follows. In developing countries where
subsidiary setup costs are large and patent protection is weak, the N rm chooses
to conduct in-house R&D in the North. Strengthened patent protection encourages
contractual R&D as it increases the S rm's incentive to change from an imitator
to an innovator. Alternatively, the Southern country with weak patent protection
may be able to attract an R&D subsidiary by reducing the setup costs of the R&D
subsidiary. In particular, the Southern government could focus on the improvement
of infrastructure, the institutions as well as providing multinational rms with FDI
subsidies including job-creation subsidies, tax cut and even the construction of indus-
trial facilities. Strengthened patent protection could further encourage contractual
R&D activities between the N rm and the S rm.
8 Concluding remarks
This paper oers a new perspective on the protection of intellectual property in
developing countries. We develop a model to illustrate the important role of intellec-
tual property in shaping the landscape of international specialization in research and
development. Our analysis yields several interesting results. First, by reducing the
23Southern rm's prots under imitation, strengthened intellectual property protection
in developing countries increases the Southern rm's incentive to undertake contrac-
tual R&D, thereby encouraging the international specialization in R&D. Second, the
multinational rm's strategic behavior on weak enforcement of IPR may encourage
contractual R&D in developing countries. This is due to the increase in the total
industry prot extracted by the multinational rm as the S rm produces more e-
ciently under strategic weak IPR enforcement. Further, we nd that Southern welfare
could rise with strengthened IPR under large cost saving from innovation and the
relatively strong bargaining position of the Southern rm. Finally, we show how a
policy mix of IPR and FDI subsidy in developing countries aects R&D activities by
adding an oshore R&D subsidiary as an alternative organizational form.
Given the recent surge in international fragmentation in both production and
research and development, the policy implications we nd here may be helpful for
policymakers in developing countries in fashioning their reforms in intellectual prop-
erty. Specically, our analysis suggests that stronger patent protection is likely to
expand the international contractual R&D activities where both a multinational rm
and a local rm have competitive advantage in one stage of the R&D chain respec-
tively. Alternatively, the Southern country with weak patent protection could oer
incentives to multinational rms in establishing oshore R&D subsidiaries by reduc-
ing their R&D subsidiary setup costs.
Our analysis can be extended to more general environments. We have assumed
that the S rm can only license its technology on one component of a product to
one N rm. However, in the real world it is possible that the S rm may license its
technology on one component to multiple N rms who produce dierentiated goods
but all use the S rm's technology as one stage in the R&D chain. For example, a
lot of pharmaceutical rms in India are licensing the technology on one molecule to
24multiple multinational rms who use molecule as one component of their product.
If we include this possibility in our model, the S rm's bargaining power will be
increased in the sense that there are a large number of potential buyers. It is likely
that the N rms only get their reservation values and all the surplus accrues to the S
rm. Hence, the S rm has more incentive to change from an imitator to an innovator
who undertakes contractual R&D and our conclusions will be strengthened.
Another promising avenue for future research is to extend the analysis to examine
the impact of a policy mix of R&D subsidy policy and IPR policy on R&D oshore
outsourcing. The R&D subsidy policy in developing countries can be aected by
their IPR policy as strengthened IPR policy may change domestic rms' incentive to
undertake contractual R&D. This analysis will be important for developing countries
as R&D subsidy policy plays a vital role in shaping domestic innovative capacity
which are considered to be central to domestic economic growth.
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28Appendix A: Equilibrium results under no patent protection.
This appendix provides a detailed illustration of the equilibrium results in the
presence of licensing under no patent protection.
The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution is
N = dN + (   dN   dS) and S = dS + (1   )(   dN   dS). Here, N
and S are the Nash bargaining solutions;  is the joint prot of both rms under
licensing;  is the bargaining power of player N, and 1  is the bargaining power of
player S; dN and dS are the disagreement points.
In this paper we assume that the N rm oers a take-it-or-leave-it contract to
the S rm in this paper, thus the N rm's bargaining power  is equal to 1. And the
payos of the N and S rm under a successful licensing are
N = dN + (   dN   dS) and S = dS.
Hence, a successful licensing only occurs when the joint prot of both rms under
licensing is greater than that under an outside option.
The joint prot under licensing is given by N(~ cN;~ cS) + S(~ cN;~ cS)   RS. And
the joint prot under strategy (i), (ii) and (iii) is given by
N(~ cN;c
S)+S(~ cN;c
S) RN; N(~ cN;~ cS)+S(~ cN;~ cS) RN RS; and N(~ cN;~ c
S)+
S(~ cN;~ c
S)   RN   RS, respectively.
It is obvious that the joint prot under strategy (ii) is always less than that under
licensing.
For simplicity, we assume that the N rm's R&D cost on component 2 is so high
that RN > N(~ cN;~ c
S) + S(~ cN;~ c
S)   N(~ cN;~ cS)   S(~ cN;~ cS), which implies that the
joint prot under licensing is greater than that under strategy (iii).
29The S rm's payos under strategy (i), (ii) and (iii) under no patent protection
are S(~ cN;c
S), S(~ cN;~ cS) RS and S(~ cN;~ c
S) RS, respectively. It is straightforward
that its payo under strategy (ii) is always dominated by strategy (iii) because the S
rm does not need to pay the imitation cost in case of patent infringement under no
patent protection. Thus, we focus on the analysis on payos of strategy (i) and (iii).
Let K1 denote S(~ cN;~ c
S) S(~ cN;c
S). Then strategy (iii) dominates strategy (i)
for the S rm if RS < K1. Let K2 denote RN +N(~ cN;~ cS)+S(~ cN;~ cS) N(~ cN;c
S) 
S(~ cN;c
S). Thus, the joint prot under licensing is greater than that under strategy
(i) if RS < K2. For simplicity we assume K1 < K2.
Therefore, we have the following ndings:
If RS > K1, strategy (i) dominates strategy (iii) for the S rm. A successful
licensing where the reservation values are the payos under strategy (i) occurs if
K1 < RS < K2 and will not occur if RS > K2.
If RS < K1, strategy (iii) dominates strategy (i) for the S rm. In this case a
successful licensing where the reservation values are payos under strategy (iii) always
occurs.
In short, a successful licensing occurs where the reservation values are payos
under strategy (iii) for RS < K1; a successful licensing occurs where the reservation
values are the payos under strategy (i) for K1 < RS < K2 and no licensing occurs
for RS > K2. The corresponding licensing fee is L = S(~ cN;~ c
S)   S(~ cN;~ cS) for
RS < K1 and L = RS + S(~ cN;c
S)   S(~ cN;~ cS) for K1 < RS < K2.
30Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1.
With strengthened patent protection, the joint prot under licensing is given by
N(~ cN;~ cS) + S(~ cN;~ cS)   RS. And the joint prot under strategy (i), (ii) and (iii)
is given by N(~ cN;c
S) + S(~ cN;c
S)   RN, N(~ cN;~ cS) + S(~ cN;~ cS)   RN   RS, and
N(~ cN;~ c
S) + S(~ cN;~ c
S)   RN   RS, respectively.
The S rm's payo under strategy (i), (ii) and (iii) in the absence of a successful
licensing under strengthened patent protection are S(~ cN;c
S)   I, S(~ cN;~ cS)   RS
and S(~ cN;~ c
S)   RS   I, respectively. Here we discuss two cases.
I. If I < S(~ cN;~ c
S)   S(~ cN;~ cS), strategy (iii) dominates strategy (ii) and the
analysis is similar to that in Appendix A. Let K0
2 denote RN+N(~ cN;~ cS)+S(~ cN;~ cS) 
N(~ cN;c
S)   S(~ cN;c
S) + I. We then have the following ndings:
If RS > K1, strategy (i) dominates strategy (iii) for the S rm. The S rm
chooses strategy (i) in stage 2. A successful licensing where the reservation values are
the payos under strategy (i) occurs if K1 < RS < K0
2 and will not occur if RS > K0
2.
If RS < K1, strategy (iii) dominates strategy (i) for the S rm. In this case a
successful licensing where the reservation values are payos under strategy (iii) always
occurs.
In summary, a successful licensing occurs where the reservation values are payos
under strategy (iii) for RS < K1; a successful licensing where the reservation values
are the payos under strategy (i) occurs for K1 < RS < K0
2 and no licensing occurs
for RS > K0
2 when I < S(~ cN;~ c
S) S(~ cN;~ cS). Therefore, a successful licensing only
occurs for RS < K0
2, which shows that strengthened patent protection increases rms'
incentive for specialization in undertaking R&D as K0
2 is greater than K2.
II. If I > S(~ cN;~ c
S)   S(~ cN;~ cS), strategy (ii) dominates strategy (iii). Let K3
31denote I + S(~ cN;~ cS)   S(~ cN;c
S). Thus, we have the following ndings:
If RS < K3, strategy (ii) dominates strategy (i). Since the joint prot under
strategy (ii) is always greater than that under licensing, a successful licensing always
occurs where the reservation values are payos under strategy (ii).
If RS > K3, strategy (i) dominates strategy (ii). The S rm chooses strategy (i)
in stage 2. A successful licensing occurs where the reservation values are the payos
under strategy (i) if K3 < RS < K0
2 and will not occur if RS > K0
2.23
In summary, a successful licensing occurs where the reservation values are payos
under strategy (ii) for RS < K3; a successful licensing where the reservation values
are the payos under strategy (i) occurs for K3 < RS < K0
2 and no licensing occurs
for RS > K0
2 when I > S(~ cN;~ c
S)   S(~ cN;~ cS). Again, it shows that strengthened
patent protection increases rms' incentive for specialization in undertaking R&D as
K0
2 is greater than K2.
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 2.
This appendix proves Proposition 2.
As shown in Appendix B, with strong enforcement the contractual licensing oc-
curs if RS > K0
2 and does not occur otherwise. As the N rm has the new option of
strategic weak IPR enforcement, the S rm's outside options do not change. Accord-
ingly both rms' reservation values without licensing have no change, but the joint
prot under licensing will be changed due to the N rm' new option of strategic weak
IPR enforcement. The joint prot of the N and S rm under contractual R&D is
23Here we assume that K0
2 > K3. The conclusion will not be changed if we relax this assumption.
32N(~ cN;~ cS)+S(~ cN;~ cS) RS with strong enforcement and N(~ cN;~ c
S)+S(~ cN;~ c
S) RS
with weak enforcement. We show that the joint industry prot with weak enforce-
ment is greater than that with strong enforcement in the text, therefore the N rm
opts for strategic weak enforcement under contractual R&D.
Let K denote N(~ cN;~ c
S) + S(~ cN;~ c
S)   N(~ cN;c
S)   S(~ cN;c
S) + RN + I. Then
the joint prot under contractual R&D with weak enforcement is greater than that
under outside options for RS < K. In short, we have the following equilibrium
results: (1) Contractual R&D occurs for RS < K where the S rm undertakes R&D
on component 2 along with imitating the N rm's technology on component 1 without
a lawsuit from the N rm; (2) Contractual R&D does not occur otherwise.
Comparing K0
2 with K, it is straightforward to show that K is greater than K0
2.
Hence, we nd that for K0
2 < RS < K contractual R&D would occur if the N rm
has the option of strategic weak IPR enforcement, but would not occur with strong
IPR enforcement.
Appendix D: Southern welfare
D.1 Southern welfare with no patent protection
Welfare of the Southern country is the sum of local consumer surplus and the S
rm's production prot. Let qN and qS denote output of the N and S rm in the
Southern country. Then the Southern welfare is given by WS = 0:5(qS + qN)2 + S.
For RS < K1 a successful licensing occurs where the reservation values are payos






33For K1 < RS < K2 a successful licensing occurs where the reservation values are
the payos under strategy (i), hence the southern welfare is given by
WS =
(2a   ~ cN   ~ cS)2
18
+




For RS > K2, no licensing occurs and strategy (i) is the equilibrium. The South-







D.2 Southern welfare with strengthened patent protection
Under strengthened patent protection, we mainly discuss the case when I <
S(~ cN;~ c
S)   S(~ cN;~ cS), which implies that strategy (iii) dominates strategy (ii) for
the S rm.
For RS < K1, a successful licensing occurs where the reservation values are payos
under strategy (iii). The Southern welfare is given by
WS =
(2a   ~ cN   ~ cS)2
18
+
(a + ~ cN   2~ c
S)2
9
  RS   I:
For K1 < RS < K0
2, a successful licensing occurs where the reservation values are






For KS > K0
2, no licensing occurs while strategy (i) is the equilibrium. The







D.3 Change in southern welfare shifting from no patent protection to
strengthened patent protection
Here we focus on the analysis of the case where in equilibrium the S rm is an
34imitator under no patent protection and becomes an innovator undertaking contrac-
tual R&D under strengthened patent protection for K2 < RS < K0
2. Under no patent







Under strengthened patent protection, it becomes
WS =
(2a   ~ cN   ~ cS)2
18
+




D.4 Southern welfare with strategic weak enforcement
With the strategic weak enforcement, a successful licensing occurs where the
reservation values are payos under strategy (iii) for RS < K1. There the Southern
welfare is
WS =








For K1 < RS < K, a successful licensing occurs where the reservation values are







For RS > K0
2, no licensing occurs while strategy (i) is the equilibrium. Hence,







D.5 Change in southern welfare shifting from strong enforcement to
strategic weak enforcement
Here we mainly discuss the case where the equilibrium regime is imitation without
innovation under strong enforcement and it becomes contractual R&D under strategic
weak enforcement for K0
2 < RS < K.














Appendix E: Equilibrium results with a R&D subsidiary
First consider the case that the setting up cost of a R&D subsidiary is suciently
large (f > RN   RS). In this event the N rm's prot of conducting in-house R&D
in the North is greater than that via a R&D subsidiary. As a result the equilibrium
results are the same as those illustrated in Appendix B. Under weak patent protection
the N rm conducts in-house R&D. As the Southern countries strengthened patent
protection, the equilibrium shifts from integration at home (conducting in-house R&D
in the North) to outsourcing (undertaking contractual R&D), where the Southern rm
shifts from an imitator to an innovator.
Next consider the case that the setting up cost of a R&D subsidiary is suciently
small (f < RN  RS). In this case the N rm's prot of conducting in-house R&D in
the North is less than that via a R&D subsidiary. Under the circumstance that the S
rm's payo under option (i) has the highest value among the three outside options,
the joint surplus of both rms is given by +N(~ cN;~ cS) + S(~ cN;~ cS)   N(~ cN;c
S)  
S(~ cN;c
S). As a result, contractual R&D would occur if f > N(~ cN;c
S)+S(~ cN;c
S) 
N(~ cN;~ cS) S(~ cN;~ cS). Thus, under weak patent protection (smallI), in equilibrium
contractual R&D does not occur and the N rm chooses to conduct R&D via an
R&D subsidiary. Strengthened patent protection (largeI) shifts the equilibrium from
integration abroad (set up an R&D subsidiary) to outsourcing (undertake contractual
R&D). If the S rm's payo under option (ii) has the highest value among the three
36outside options, the joint surplus of both rms is given by RS + f. In this case
contractual R&D always happens and larger setting up cost increases the N rm's
incentive of cooperating with the S rm. Under the circumstance that the S rm's
payo under option (iii) has the highest value among the three outside options, the
joint surplus of both rms is given by RS +f +N(~ cN;~ cS)+S(~ cN;~ cS) N(~ cN;~ c
S) 
S(~ cN;~ c
S). Accordingly, contractual R&D would occur if RS + f > N(~ cN;~ c
S) +
S(~ cN;~ c
S) N(~ cN;~ cS) S(~ cN;~ cS). In this case the analysis is similar to that where
the S rm's payo under option (i) has the highest value among the three outside
options.
37Figure 1. Equilibrium Results under Dierent Circumstances
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